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In this paper we examine the impact of inflation on financial development in Brazil. The data available 
permit us to cover the eventful period between 1985 and 2002 and the results-based initially on time 
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and financial development measures-suggest that high and erratic rates of inflation presented 
deleterious effects on finance at the time. The main policy implication arising from the results is that 
poor macroeconomic performance, exemplified by high rates of inflation, can only have detrimental  
effects on finance, a variable that is important for directly affecting, e.g., economic growth and 
development, and income inequality. Therefore, low and stable inflation is a necessary first step to 
achieve a more inclusive and active financial sector with all its attached benefits. 
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 1 Introduction and Motivation
The distortions caused by high rates of inﬂation on certain economic vari-
ables have been consistently studied for being of crucial importance for the
(mal) functioning of an economy. Firstly, high inﬂation is detrimental to
economic growth and development. More speciﬁcally, De Gregorio (1993),
Fischer (1993), Barro (1995), Bullard and Keating (1995), Clark (1997),
Barro (1998), Bruno and Easterly (1998), and Fischer (2005), study the
eﬀects of inﬂation on growth and the results they report–based on interna-
tional cross-section, time-series and panel data–conﬁrm the fact that high
inﬂation outweighs the Mundell-Tobin eﬀect, and therefore presents a detri-
mental eﬀect on growth. Complementary to that, Cooley and Hansen (1989)
and De Gregorio (1993), highlight the fact that higher inﬂation has the eﬀect
of reducing labour supply, and consequently to reduce growth.
Secondly, high inﬂation is also bad for income inequality. For example,
Cardoso, Barros, et al. (1995), Barros, Corseuil, et al. (2000), Ferreira and
Litchﬁeld (2001), and Bittencourt (2005)–utilising time series, panel, and
panel time series analysis–report that the high rates of inﬂation existent in
Brazil in the 1980s and ﬁrst half of the 1990s were signiﬁcantly regressive on
inequality, and therefore did oﬀset any progressive eﬀect supposedly coming
from the debtor and creditor channel1.
Hence, high rates of inﬂation signiﬁes, ﬁrstly, reduced investment spend-
ing and a substitution from labour supply to leisure, which directly and
negatively aﬀects growth and capital accumulation; and secondly, it signi-
ﬁes increased inequality, for indexation–and all that it entails–is assumed
to be an imperfect mechanism of protection against galloping inﬂation, hence
it aﬀects inequality by oﬀsetting the creditor and debtor channel2 3.
1Alternatively, e.g. Blinder and Esaki (1978), and Romer and Romer (1999), report
that moderate inﬂation presents progressive eﬀects on inequality in the US precisely via
the debtor and creditor channel which keeps the debts of the poor ﬁxed at least in the
short run.
2Agénor and Montiel (1999) cover the issue of under and over indexation (low and high
wages, respectively) in developing countries that presented high rates of inﬂation in the
1970s, 1980s and early 1990s. Moreover, Sturzenegger (1992), Erosa and Ventura (2002),
and Cysne et al. (2005) show that the rich are able to hold currencies and a consumption
bundle that are not aﬀected by the inﬂation tax. Hence, the rich, when compared to the
poor and middle classes, beneﬁt from high inﬂation. Furthermore, Crowe (2006) argues
that macroeconomic stabilisation took so long to take place in, e.g. Brazil because the
rich have always beneﬁted from high inﬂation.
3For a more thorough survey on the costs of inﬂation, see Briault (1995) or Fischer
1On the other hand, in a seminal study, Schumpeter (1936) highlights
how important credit is for economic growth and development. The Schum-
peterian analysis is based on the idea that credit, when in the hands of
the ‘entrepreneur’, is conducive of growth4. Following that lead, King and
Levine (1993), Levine and Zervos (1998), Beck, Levine, et al. (2000), and
Beck and Levine (2004)–using cross-sections and panels of countries, and
covering the period between 1960 and 1998–report that diﬀerent measures
of ﬁnancial development have a positive impact on long-run growth5.
Furthermore, ﬁnance is known to present progressive eﬀects on eco-
nomic inequality and poverty. Li, Squire, et al. (1998), Dollar and Kraay
(2002), Clark, Xu, et al. (2003), Honohan (2004), Beck, Demirguc-Kunt,
et al. (2004), Bonﬁglioli (2006) and Bittencourt (2006), employing diﬀerent
sorts of data and analysis, report that ﬁnance reduces either inequality or
poverty6.
Therefore, ﬁnancial development is important because it channels credit
to be utilised by the ‘entrepreneur’ in promoting productive investment that
positively alters the normal ‘ﬂow’ of an economy, and therefore enhances
growth and development. Moreover, ﬁnance facilitates investment in, e.g.
short and long-run productive activities, which reduces the social immobil-
ity of the poorer relative to the richer, and consequently alleviates-reduces
inequality.
Thus, determining what causes ﬁnancial development in a major devel-
oping country like Brazil–which has presented historically high inequality
and erratic growth rates, and extremely high and volatile rates of inﬂation
for a long period of time–is important because ﬁnance can have the afore-
mentioned incremental eﬀect on growth and development, and a progressive
eﬀect on inequality. In other words, ﬁnance can display a double welfare im-
provement eﬀect on to two of the most important economic problems faced
(2005).
4Schumpeter expertly writes "credit is essentially the creation of purchasing power
for the purpose of transferring it to the entrepreneur, but not simply the transfer of
existing purchasing power. The creation of purchasing power characterises, in principle,
the method by which development is carried out in a system with private property and
division of labor", Schumpeter (1936).
5For a thorough survey on the literature of ﬁnance and growth, see Levine (2004).
6On the theoretical side, Loury (1981), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Galor and
Zeira (1993), Banerjee and Newman (1993), Aghion and Bolton (1997), and Piketty (1997),
highlight the fact that more widespread credit reduces inequality via the investment in
productive-activities channel.
2by Brazil, and by other developing countries too.
On the other hand, inﬂation–for having being used many times before
as a proxy for macroeconomic performance, and given its erratic nature–
arises as a natural and important macroeconomic determinant of ﬁnancial
development in Brazil. Intuitively speaking, galloping inﬂation increases
macroeconomic uncertainty (a drastic disinﬂationary policy is expected to
be implemented at some point, however the timing is uncertain)–it reduces
the returns on savings and the incentives of savers, therefore reducing the
amount of ﬁnance or credit provided in an economy–which in turn leads
to the mentioned deleterious consequences on growth and development, and
inequality. Hence, in this paper we examine closely the statistical and eco-
nomic relationship which exists between inﬂation and ﬁnancial development
in Brazil. Although this is a subject that presents a solid theoretical base,
empirical studies are still scarce.
Choi, Smith, et al. (1996), and Azariadis and Smith (1996), highlight the
fact that if inﬂation is high enough, returns on savings are reduced–which
leads to a reduction in savings and savers alike, the pool of borrowers is
swamped, informational frictions become more severe–and therefore credit
becomes scarce in such an economy. On a slightly diﬀerent strand, Schreft
and Smith (1997), Boyd and Smith (1998), Huybens and Smith (1998), and
Huybens and Smith (1999), explore the idea that economies with higher
rates of inﬂation do not approach or reach the steady state point where their
capital stocks are high, i.e. there are bifurcations and development traps
arise in such economies. Furthermore, these economies obviously present
less eﬃcient ﬁnancial markets because of the higher interest rates that follow
high rates of inﬂation.
On the empirical side, Haslag and Koo (1999), and Boyd, Levine, et al.
(2001), using cross-sectional and panel international data from the 1960s
to early 1990s, report that moderate inﬂation has a negative impact on
ﬁnancial development, as theoretically predicted. Moreover, both studies
ﬁnd evidence of nonlinearities, i.e. after a particular threshold–15 percent
per year in Boyd, Levine, et al. (2001)–inﬂation presents only smaller
marginal negative eﬀects on ﬁnance. The intuition, not backed by theory
though, is that the damage on ﬁnance is done at rates of inﬂation lower than
the proposed threshold.
Having said that, we use data, mainly from the Brazilian Census Bu-
3reau and the Brazilian Central Bank, covering the period between 1985 to
2002 and ten diverse and major regions, to better examine the relationship
between inﬂation and ﬁnance. These sort of data that present a larger time-
series T dimension than the panel N variation, i.e. T ￿ N, permit us to
explore the time-series variation, more related to the short-run, and also the
important regional or panel variation present in the data. Furthermore, this
time span is particularly interesting because it encapsulates two distinct pe-
riods in terms of macroeconomic performance in Brazil. The period between
1985 and 1994 covers the time when the rates of inﬂation were extremely
high and volatile, reaching an astounding 82.18 percent per month in March
1990. However, from 1995 onwards, after the implementation of the Real
Plan7, inﬂation has been consistently stable and somehow much lower, and
macroeconomic performance signiﬁcantly improved8.
The empirical evidence that we report, based initially on the time series
T → ∞ variation, and then on panel time series data and analysis, con-
ﬁrms the predictions that inﬂation is bad for ﬁnancial development. The
evidence is signiﬁcant, and robust for diﬀerent data sets, diﬀerent measures
of ﬁnancial development, diﬀerent speciﬁcations, and diﬀerent estimators.
The main policy implication emerging from this evidence is that high and
volatile rates of inﬂation have a clear detrimental eﬀect on a variable that is
known to play an important role on economic growth and development, and
economic inequality. Therefore, it can be said that low (high) and stable
(unstable) inﬂation is a target that must (not) be consistently pursued in
Brazil if it is to have a more sophisticated and inclusive ﬁnancial structure
with all its attached beneﬁts. What follows from the above is that clear
ﬁscal rules, which avoid large deﬁcits that will eventually cause inﬂation to
rise, and a more independent and transparent central bank must be in place
in developing countries in general so that these countries can then reap the
beneﬁts of stability.
What distinguishes this paper from previous studies is that, ﬁrstly, we
7The stabilisation plan that was gradually implemented during the ﬁrst half of 1994.
The Real (R$) itself was introduced in July 1994. For a textbook treatment of this plan,
see Agénor and Montiel (1999).
8Singh (2006), Singh and Cerisola (2006), and Santiso (2006) highlight the importance
of the much improved macroeconomic performance in Latin America in producing better
economic outcomes recently. Moreover, Carvalho and Chamon (2006) suggest that the
growth of real income that took place after the reforms of the 1990’s in Brazil has been
severe understimated for methodological reasons.
4utilise, as suggested by Fischer (1993) and Besley and Burgess (2003), na-
tional data to construct a more disaggregated subnational data set, which
we believe better pinpoints the importance of inﬂation on ﬁnancial devel-
opment in a country so regionally diverse in terms of economic outcomes.
Furthermore–to carry out the study, and in addition to the time series
T → ∞ data–we take advantage of the novel panel time series T ￿ N
analysis, which deals with important empirical issues–bias in dynamic pan-
els, heterogeneity bias, and between-region dependence–not discussed in
the previous empirical studies, to get better and more informative estimates.
Additionally, this is particularly important because this sort of analysis does
not suﬀer from the usual criticism applied to cross-sectional data and analy-
sis, e.g. that since a period of high inﬂation is normally followed by a period
of low inﬂation, high inﬂation’s detrimental eﬀects would be cancelled by
low inﬂation9.
Secondly, we take into consideration the problem of ﬁnancial repression
existent in Brazil during the high-inﬂation period, and therefore use an
extra measure of ﬁnancial development that to some extent accounts for
this problem. All in all, we ﬁll in an important blank in the literature
by exploring national and subnational data, with time-series and regional
variation, from an important developing country that provides a rich ground
to study and better understand the impact of inﬂation on ﬁnance.
The remainder of this paper has the following structure: Section 4.2
describes the data set used, and also presents some correlations and regres-
sion plots of the main variables. Section 4.3 explains the empirical strategy
utilised and reports the main results obtained. Section 4.4 concludes the
paper: it summarises the importance of the results and their implications in
terms of policy, it acknowledges some limitations in terms of data availabil-
ity, and it suggests future work.
2 The Data
2.1 Description of the Data
The data set we use comes from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and
Statistics (IBGE), which is the Brazilian Census Bureau, the Brazilian
9See Bruno and Easterly (1998).
5Central Bank (BACEN), and the Institute of Applied Economic Research
(IPEA) ﬁles. The IPEA is an agency of the Brazilian government that,
among other activities, compiles primary and provides secondary data from
a variety of national and international sources.
This data set covers the period between 1985 and 2002 and ten regions,
i.e. from North to South; Pará (PA), Ceará (CE), Pernambuco (PE), Bahia
(BA), Distrito Federal (DF), Minas Gerais (MG), Rio de Janeiro (RJ), São
Paulo (SP), Paraná (PR) and Rio Grande do Sul (RS). To brieﬂy illustrate
the importance of these regions in the national context, they accounted for 49
percent of the total population and 83 percent of the total domestic product
in 1995. Moreover, in terms of regional variation, this data set includes a
Southern region like São Paulo, with a per capita domestic product of around
R$ 10 billion, and also a region like Pará in the North of the country, with a
per capita domestic product of roughly R$ 3 billion in 1995. Furthermore,
although Brazil is, in fact, divided into 27 regions, there is not any data set
with more national coverage than the one used here.
The data used to construct the measures of ﬁnancial development are
originally from the BACEN’s Monthly Bulletin (monetary aggregates), and
IBGE’s National Accounts System (domestic products). The ﬁrst annualised
monetary aggregate used is the usual m2, and it is deﬁned as money in
circulation in the economy plus current account and saving deposits in the
ﬁnancial institutions. The second monetary aggregate, m3, is deﬁned as m2
plus other ﬁnancial assets which are more illiquid, but with higher rates
of nominal and real returns than the ones in m2. Moreover, credit to the
private sector (credit) and personal credit (personal) are deﬁned respectively
as credit provided by public and private ﬁnancial institutions to ﬁrms and to
individuals, and individuals only. The reason for including credit provided
by the public ﬁnancial institutions is because in Brazil they oﬀer the general
public the usual commercial ﬁnancial services that are normally provided
only by private institutions. All these monetary aggregates are deﬂated by
the IBGE’s National Index of Consumer Prices (INPC).
The regional and national Gross Domestic Products (GDPs), and re-
gional Financial Domestic Products (FDPs)–which accounts for the gross
domestic product of the ﬁnancial sector by region–are calculated at market
prices and deﬂated by the IBGE’s GDP implicit deﬂator.
We can then calculate the ratios m2/GDP, m3/GDP, credit/GDP and
6personal/GDP at regional and national levels to obtain M2, M3, CREDIT
and PERSONAL, respectively. To calculate these measures at national
level we only have to use the information on the national monetary ag-
gregates over the national GDPs. To construct the regional measures of
ﬁnancial development we have to take into account the fact that the data
on monetary aggregates are provided only at national level. We therefore
use the available national data on monetary aggregates divided by the re-
gional domestic products, and multiplied by the percentage participation
of each region in the national Financial Domestic Product to construct our
regional proxies for ﬁnancial development.
The reason for doing so is that otherwise the most developed regions of
the South would not appear as ﬁnancially developed as they actually are.
More speciﬁcally, with this weighting, the measures of ﬁnancial development
(re) capture more accurately the regional variation in ﬁnancial development
existent among the diﬀerent regions of Brazil. For example, the Distrito
Federal (where the federal capital Brasília is located), São Paulo and Rio
de Janeiro, regain their places among the most ﬁnancially developed regions
after the weighting. Deﬁnitions 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the regional (FDit)
and national (FDt) measures of ﬁnancial development respectively.
FDit = (mon.aggregatest/gdpit)fdpit, (1)
where fdpit= fdpi/fdpt, and
FDt = mon.aggregatest/gdpt. (2)
Furthermore, the reason for using M3 in addition to the usual M2, is
because during the high-inﬂation period, Brazil presented the problem of
ﬁnancial repression–the government kept the basic nominal interest rates
artiﬁcially low, generating with that negative real interest rates–and there-
fore a low M210. Additionally, the measure PERSONAL captures credit
being allocated to individuals who might lack the collateral available to,
e.g. ﬁrms, and captured by the usual CREDIT. We therefore believe that
these extra measures provide a more accurate view of ﬁnance in Brazil at
the time for, ﬁrstly, broadening the usual M2 to account for assets that,
10Agénor and Montiel (1999), and Easterly (2002), cover the issue of ﬁnancial repression
in developing countries in general.
7although less liquid, would not suﬀer as much from ﬁnancial repression and
high inﬂation for having higher rates of returns (not to mention higher levels
of indexation), and secondly, for narrowing the usual CREDIT to account
for those resources being allocated at a more individual level.
That said, the data on the rates of inﬂation (INFL) come from the
IBGE’s regional Consumer Price Indexes (IPCs) and the national INPC. The
IPCs cover the ten mentioned regions, and families residing in those regions
and whose heads are earning the equivalent to eight times the monthly
national minimum wage. This regional information is then compiled and
aggregated by the IBGE, using the resident population in each region as
weight, to form the national INPC itself. The advantage of these indexes
is that, as mentioned above, the IBGE is the institution that covers the
Brazilian territory most thoroughly, and therefore there is not any other
alternative with more regional variation and coverage than the IPCs and
INPC themselves11.
The other macroeconomic control variables utilised are the regional gov-
ernment expenditure over the regional GDPs (GOV ), and the already de-
ﬁned regional Financial Domestic Product (FDP), which accounts for the
domestic product of the ﬁnancial sector in each region. GOV encapsulates
all expenditure on current public services provided, including education and
health, by regional governments. The expenditure by the regional govern-
ments are deﬂated by the IBGE’s INPC and the data come from the IPEA
ﬁles.
2.2 Behaviour of the Data
The rates of inﬂation were notoriously high and volatile during the 1980s
and ﬁrst half of the 1990s in Brazil. The two most visible hyperinﬂationary
bursts happened in 1989-1990–1,863 percent in 1989, and 82 percent in
March 1990–and then again in 1994 (2,489 percent in 1993). However,
after July 1994, with the implementation of the Real Plan, inﬂation has
been consistently stable and much lower than previously12.
About the measures of ﬁnancial development, it can be said that all
measures presented sharp reductions right before, during and after the ﬁrst
11For more on these price indexes, see Corseuil and Foguel (2002).
12It is worth mentioning that, although lower and more stable, the average rate of
inﬂation between 1995 and 2002 is still 9.47 percent.
8hyperinﬂationary burst of 1989-1990–and then again, although less sharply
than before–during and after the second burst of hyperinﬂation in 1993-
1994. On the other hand, after the stabilisation of 1994-1995, all measures
have experienced a constant increase in their sizes and importance. Figure
One illustrates the above using the national time-series variation in the data.


































































Source: IBGE, BACEN, IPEA and author’s own calculations.
Moreover, we continue to explore this national time-series variation in the
data to calculate some statistical correlations and also to investigate whether
there is any economic causality among the measures of ﬁnancial development
and inﬂation. This analysis provides an initial statistical insight into the
variation present in the data and it also works as a robustness test for
the empirical results based on regional information, which are presented in
Section 4.3 below.
Table One provides the correlations between ﬁnance and inﬂation. Firstly,
it is seen that all measures of ﬁnancial development are positively correlated
with each other (as it should be), and all correlations are statistically sig-
niﬁcant at the 5 percent level. Secondly, and most importantly for our
purposes here, all measures are negatively correlated with inflation, with
9the measures CREDIT, PERSONAL and M3 being signiﬁcant at the 5
percent level, and M2 being signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. It is worth
mentioning that CREDIT and PERSONAL (this one being the narrowest
and smallest in size of all), present the highest negative correlations with
the rates of inﬂation. This highlights the importance of inﬂation in aﬀecting
those measures that provide funds to be invested in productive activities
such as education and physical capital in particular (long run), and, e.g.
self-employment activities in general (short run). No less important is the
eﬀect of inﬂation on M3, a measure more associated with the provision of
indexed assets, and that by nature, would provide some insulation against
high inﬂation during crisis.
Table One: Correlation Matrix, Financial Development and Inﬂation,
Brazil 1985-2002.
Variables M2 M3 CREDIT PERSONAL INFL
M2 1
M3 .983* 1
CREDIT .596* .691* 1
PERSONAL .857* .853* .648* 1
INFL -.481** -.505* -.635* -.664* 1
Source: BACEN, IBGE, IPEA and author’s own calculations. * signiﬁcant at the 5
percent level, and ** signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
Additionally, we run univariate OLS time-series regressions to further in-
vestigate the statistical-economic relationship existent between inﬂation and
ﬁnance. Figure Two shows how the four measures of ﬁnancial development
fared against inﬂation, and the clear and statistically signiﬁcant results aris-
ing from these regressions is that high and volatile rates of inﬂation present
a clear negative eﬀect on all measures of ﬁnance. Moreover, it is important
to mention the role of inﬂation on M3, since it presents the largest estimates
among all the measures–which highlights that a measure that, in principle,
would not suﬀer from high inﬂation and ﬁnancial repression for encapsu-
lating assets which present higher nominal and real returns than the ones
provided by M2–is in fact heavily aﬀected by the high rates of inﬂation
existent at the time.
10Figure Two: Regression Lines, Financial Development and Inﬂation,
Brazil 1985-2002.





























































Source: BACEN, IBGE, IPEA and author’s own calculations. All estimates are
statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
In summary, ﬁrstly, the above preliminary visual evidence brieﬂy illus-
trates the behaviour of the national time series data during the period, par-
ticularly the fact that during the hyperinﬂationary periods the measures of
ﬁnancial development presented considerable reductions in their size. This
shows that macroeconomic uncertainty, caused by high rates of inﬂation, is
detrimental to ﬁnance. More intuitively, the high inﬂation existent between
1985 and 1994 created a clear sense of uncertainty in terms of expectations
of a drastic disinﬂationary policy that would come at some point with all its
costs13. This uncertainty, combined with the restrictive stabilisation plans
themselves, played a central role in reducing the amount of ﬁnance available
in the economy at the time.
13For instance, the Collor Plan implemented in 1990 was not only a stabilisation attempt
based on restrictive monetary policies, but it also conﬁscated a huge fraction of ﬁnancial
assets in the economy. Furthermore, the Cruzado Plan implemented in 1986 relied heavily
on price controls to stabilise high inﬂation. See Agénor and Montiel (1999) or Kiguel and
Liviatan (1992) for more on these Plans.
11On the other hand, the somewhat shorter visual evidence covering the pe-
riod between 1995 and 2002 suggests that ﬁnance presented a clear increase
at the time, which points to the importance of a stable macroeconomic en-
vironment on ﬁnancial development, and hence on higher savings and credit
in the economy. However, since the series are shorter, this eﬀect is still not
being picked up by these initial correlation nor regression analysis.
Secondly–and complementary to the above–the statistical correlations
among the variables indicate a clear and signiﬁcant negative statistical re-
lationship between inﬂation and ﬁnance. Furthermore, the univariate OLS
time-series regressions to a large extent conﬁrm the visual and descriptive
evidence presented, and suggest that an important negative economic rela-
tionship exists between inﬂation and ﬁnance in Brazil.
3 Empirical Strategy and Results
3.1 Strategy
The data set we explore in this Section presents time series combined with
panel variation. The time series consists of T = 18, and the panel of N = 10
covering the period between 1985 and 2002. Therefore the empirical strategy
utilised is based on the relatively novel panel time series T ￿ N analysis.
This sort of analysis allows us to deal with issues such as bias in dynamic
and heterogeneous panels, and between-region dependence14.
When we estimate static models, the estimator used is the more appeal-
ing one-way Fixed Eﬀects (FE), which allows for heterogeneous intercepts
and homogeneous slopes. This estimator is more realistic than the Pooled
OLS because the FE works on the assumption that the unobserved regional
eﬀects are correlated with the regressors. Therefore, the FE (or Within
Groups) estimator explores the within variation in the data and it deliv-
ers, given certain conditions, eﬃcient and unbiased estimates of β. More
speciﬁcally, the FE estimator is OLS on deviations from group means, e.g.
14Another issue that could be dealt with in this Chapter is non-stationarity or esti-
mation with I(1) variables in panels. However, Pesaran and Smith (1995), and more
fundamentally, Phillips and Moon (1999), or Phillips and Moon (2000), argue that spu-
rious regressions are less of a problem in dynamic panels. This is because the pooled
estimators average over the regions and the noise is severely attenuated, and therefore the
estimates generated are consistent. Furthermore, Kao, Trapani and Urga (2006) suggest
that the above result holds even when spatial dependence is present.




ˆ β is consistent for large T and smallish N–which is the case here–and
therefore the incidental parameter problem is absent from our analysis15.
Equation 4.3 illustrates the static equations estimated.
FDit = αi + βINFLit + γGOVit + δFDPit + uit, (3)
where FDit is the particular regional measure-proxy of ﬁnancial development
being estimated, αi the heterogeneous intercept, INFLit the regional rates
of inﬂation, and the other regional cyclical or control variables, i.e. govern-
ment expenditure (GOVit) and the Financial Domestic Product (FDPit),
and uit the independent normal residuals.
When dynamic models are estimated, the FE estimator provides consis-
tent estimates when T → ∞ and N is ﬁxed, but only when the slopes are
homogeneous. When heterogeneous slopes are present, the estimates pro-
vided by the FE estimator become inconsistent, even for large T. Basically,
the xs will not be independent of the lagged y. The indiscriminate use of
the FE estimator in this case is to be seen with caution, since it contains
a heterogeneity bias problem, and this bias might be severe. However, the
Random Coeﬃcients (RC) estimator proposed by Swamy (1970), which al-
lows for heterogenous intercepts and slopes, gives consistent estimates of the
expected values. The RC, which can also be interpreted as a Feasible Gen-
eralised Least Square (FGLS) estimator, consists of a weighted average of ˆ αi
and ˆ βi, and the weight contains a modiﬁed variance-covariance ˜ Ω matrix of
the heterogeneous αi and βi
16. Equations 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 illustrate the RC-
FGLS estimator, and the dynamic and heterogeneous equations estimated
respectively.
15Zellner (1969), argues that all panel estimators, given some conditions, in fact present
unbiased estimates of the expected values in static models.
16An alternative to the RC-FGLS is the Mean Group estimator (MG), which consists
basically of a simple average of the time-series estimates. However, the MG is sensitive
to outliers, a problem not faced by the RC-FGLS estimator. A second alternative is the
Instrumental Variable estimator, however an instrument uncorrelated with the residuals
is uncorrelated with the explanatory variable, and therefore not a valid instrument. See
Pesaran and Smith (1995) for more on heterogeneity bias in dynamic panels, or alterna-
tively Smith and Fuertes (2004). Finally, GMM-type estimators are not an option for the
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FDit = αi + βiINFLit−1 + γiGOVit + δiFDPit + *FDit−1 + uit, (6)
where the extra FDit−1 is the ﬁrst lag of the measure of ﬁnancial develop-
ment being estimated. The use of the ﬁrst lag of the dependent variable
is important, not only because it accounts for the dynamics of ﬁnance over
time, but also because it works as a proxy for possible omitted variables.
Moreover, since our data set presents T ￿ N, between-region dependence
is believed to be through the disturbances, i.e. E(uitujt) ￿= 0. In this case,
the covariance matrix ˆ Ψ of the residuals of the time series regressions can
be estimated and used as a weight so that the between-region dependence
is captured. Therefore the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR-FGLS)
estimator is then used, and its estimates are based on the regional time series,
which are in turn averaged by the covariance matrix ˆ Ψ of the residuals17.












17An alternative to SUR-FGLS is the Common Eﬀects Estimator proposed by Pesaran
(2006), which includes the means of the explained and explanatory variables in the esti-
mated equation. However, for this estimator to work best N is assumed to be large, and
in our data set N = 10.
14FDt = αt + βINFLt + γGOVt + δFDPt + ut, (8)
where all variables estimated account for the regional time series of each
variable.
Given the brief review above, it can be said that we deal with the most
important empirical issues facing a data set which presents a long T com-
bined with a shorter N. This is important in itself because dealing with
these issues implies that we are able to deliver somewhat better and more
reliable estimates. Furthermore, the pooled estimators explore the regional
links present in the data to improve eﬃciency and to reduce collinearity, and
the SUR-FGLS estimator accounts for excessive between region-dependence
in the data and also disaggregates the analysis so that a more insightful
view of the results can be obtained. This distinction is relevant because,
as Phillips and Sul (2002) point out, if between region-dependence is large,
there is little gain in actually pooling the data, instead of using the time-
series variation only, as in the RC-FGLS and SUR-FGLS estimator.
All in all, the panel time series analysis utilised provides enough tools
to cater for diﬀerent issues, and also avoids the usual criticism that the
cross-section analysis of this subject tends to suﬀer18.
3.2 Results
The benchmark static estimates provided by the FE estimator tell us that all
measures of ﬁnancial development are negatively and signiﬁcantly aﬀected
by inﬂation. M3 and CREDIT are the variables presenting the largest
negative eﬀects, which highlights that inﬂation aﬀects the provision of better
indexed assets that would otherwise not suﬀer from inﬂation and ﬁnancial
repression during high-inﬂation periods, and also the provision and therefore
allocation of credit for investment in all sorts of productive activities.
Of the other macroeconomic control variables included, GOV presents
positive eﬀects on ﬁnancial development, although these are not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. The reason for the positive sign is because regional govern-
ment expenditure is more related to expenses on regional infrastructure–
18In addition to Bruno and Easterly (1998), see also Clark (1997) for some of the
criticism of cross-sectional analysis from an economic point of view. Furthermore, see
Phillips and Moon (1999) for some of the advantages of using pooled instead of cross-
section analysis, particularly when the variables are believed to be I(1).
15including education and health–activities that are conducive of develop-
ment. FDP delivers a similar picture, i.e. mostly positive eﬀects on ﬁ-
nance, however not entirely statistically signiﬁcant. The economic intuition
suggests that when the gross domestic product of ﬁnancial institutions is
on the rise, ﬁnancial development increases too. The Likelihood Ratio (LR)
tests indicate the presence of ﬁxed eﬀects in all equations, which conﬁrms
the FE as the right estimator to be utilised. Table Two reports the results.
Table Two: Static Estimates of Inﬂation on Financial Development, Re-
gions 1985-2002.
FE
M2 M3 CREDIT PERSONAL
INFL -.331 (-2.04) -.460 (-1.88) -.392 (-1.88) -.073 (-3.04)
GOV 1.717 (1.53) 1.971 (1.17) 1.457 (1.13) .158 (1.05)
FDP .861 (1.25) 1.425 (1.37) 3.378 (3.91) -.090 (-.89)
R2 .87 .87 .87 .79
F test 87.38 84.43 96.21 53.91
LR test 206.03 204.92 242.57 162.17
T-ratios in parentheses, number of observations: NT=180. Source: author’s own
calculations.
The dynamic equations are estimated by the FE and RC-FGLS estima-
tors respectively. The ﬁrst half of Table Three below reports the estimates
provided by the FE estimator. Inﬂation presents negative eﬀects on ﬁnance,
and most estimates are statistically signiﬁcant. GOV and FDP present the
same sort of results as those presented in Table Two, i.e. regional govern-
ment expenditure is conducive of development, and an increase in the size
of FDP leads to more ﬁnancial development in the economy. The lags of
the ﬁnancial development measures present positive eﬀects on ﬁnance, that
is to say, past ﬁnance generates present ﬁnance. The LR tests conﬁrm the
existence of ﬁxed eﬀects.
The second half of the table presents the estimates provided by the RC-
FGLS estimator. The eﬀects caused by all variables on ﬁnance follow the
same pattern, i.e. negative eﬀects of inflation on ﬁnancial development, and
positive eﬀects caused by GOV and FDP on ﬁnance. M3 and CREDIT
suﬀer particularly large eﬀects, stressing the importance of inﬂation in neg-
atively aﬀecting a measure that is, by deﬁnition, more broad than the usual
16M2 and would not be much aﬀected by ﬁnancial repression–which high-
lights that even those with access to M3, and all the indexation it provides,
would not be entirely insulated against inﬂation–and also reducing the
amount of credit in the economy, with all its deleterious eﬀects. Further-
more, the LR test suggests that the coeﬃcients are in fact heterogeneous,
which makes the RC-FGLS the most appropriate estimator in this dynamic
framework19. Table Three reports the results.
Table Three: Dynamic Estimates of Inﬂation on Financial Development,
Regions 1985-2002.
FE
M2 M3 CREDIT PERSONAL
INFL -.300 (-2.04) -.424 (-2.03) -.116 (-.81) -.044 (-2.73)
GOV 2.083 (2.04) 2.466 (1.70) 2.199 (2.49) .330 (3.29)





R2 .89 .90 .93 .89
F test 94.80 102.53 186.65 110.43
LR test 54.89 42.78 12.94 30.68
RC-FGLS
INFL -.274 (-1.84) -.397 (-2.14) -.186 (-2.83) -.038 (1.38)
GOV 1.845 (1.87) 1.749 (1.41) .853 (.64) .447 (4.03)





R2 .69 .72 .65 .83
LR test 189.32 235.00 279.70 299.74
T-ratios in parentheses, number of observations: NT=180. Source: author’s own
calculations.
19Alternatively, in speciﬁcations with lagged inﬂation as an explanatory variable, the
same sort of results arise. Available upon request.
17Between-region dependence is dealt with by the SUR-FGLS estimator.
The more disaggregated and weighted time-series equations conﬁrm the re-
sults provided above by the pooled estimators. The impact of inﬂation
on M2 and M3 is negative and signiﬁcant in almost all regions. Inﬂation
presents larger estimates against M3 than M2, and the regions most af-
fected by inﬂation are the ones located in the more developed South, i.e. the
Federal District (DF), São Paulo (SP), Rio de Janeiro (RJ), Minas Gerais
(MG), and Rio Grande do Sul (RS). This is quite intuitive because the rich-
est regions are the ones with more advanced ﬁnancial sectors, and therefore
more prone to be aﬀected by volatile rates of inﬂation. GOV and FDP
present the same sort of positive impact on ﬁnance, with most estimates
being signiﬁcant. The LM tests suggest that we can not accept the null of
independence across regions. Table Four reports the results.
18Table Four: SUR-FGLS Estimates of Inﬂation on Financial Develop-
ment, Regions 1985-2002.
SUR-FGLS
M2 PA CE PE BA DF
INFL -.179 (-4.94) -.269 (-3.18) -.178 (-2.13) -.176 (-2.56) -1.110 (1.48)
GOV .731 (4.55) 1.398 (3.95) .592 (1.14) 1.869 (4.89) 8.915 (2.73)
FDP .605 (5.11) 1.080 (2.86) .418 (1.37) .391 (1.61) 6.082 (2.84)
LM test 371.03
M3
INFL -.276 (-5.46) -.333 (-2.68) -.297 (-2.52) -.232 (-2.46) -.629 (-.54)
GOV .756 (3.23) 1.986 (4.15) .222 (.31) 2.691 (4.87) 10.420 (2.02)
FDP 1.010 (5.59) 1.607 (2.91) .769 (1.70) .635 (1.88) 6.573 (2.06)
LM test 335.69
M2 MG RJ SP PR RS
INFL -.367 (-6.26) -.658 (-5.55) -.730 (-6.10) -.023 (-.23) -.408 (-5.36)
GOV .029 (.14) 1.131 (2.04) 1.168 (1.78) 4.936 (9.15) .509 (1.02)
FDP 1.103 (6.60) 2.573 (6.56) 1.912 (4.57) .790 (1.91) 1.003 (2.74)
LM test 371.03
M3
INFL -.524 (-6.46) -.880 (-4.40) -.990 (-6.52) -.1059 (-.75) -.5551 (-5.63)
GOV -.735 (-2.58) .312 (.34) 1.065 (1.41) 6.240 (8.53) .695 (1.04)
FDP 1.578 (6.68) 3.520 (5.30) 2.711 (4.98) 1.486 (2.66) 1.553 (3.34)
LM test 335.69
T-ratios in parentheses, number of observations: NT = 180. Source: author’s own
calculations.
When the measures of ﬁnancial development are CREDIT and PERSONAL,
the impact of inﬂation on ﬁnance, as we have seen before, is negative and
mostly statistically signiﬁcant. CREDIT suﬀers larger detrimental eﬀects
than PERSONAL, and the regions most aﬀected by erratic inﬂation are the
ones with better developed ﬁnancial sectors in the more developed South.
GOV and FDP conﬁrm their roles of being conducive of ﬁnance, and most
estimates are signiﬁcant. The LM test rejects, as expected, the null of inde-
pendence across the regions, therefore suggesting that the SUR-FGLS is an
appropriate estimator in this case. Table Five reports the results.
19Table Five: SUR-FGLS Estimates of Inﬂation on Financial Develop-
ment, Regions 1985-2002.
SUR-FGLS
CREDIT PA CE PE BA DF
INFL -.211 (-4.66) -.138 (-1.38) -.209 (-2.85) -.225 (-3.26) 1.259 (1.31)
GOV .112 (.40) 1.670 (3.87) .340 (1.03) .740 (1.63) 13.936 (2.68)
FDP .591 (2.69) 1.483 (3.23) 1.052 (3.53) .869 (3.28) 6.992 (2.64)
LM test 249.05
PERSONAL
INFL -.025 (-3.24) -.071 (-3.23) -.036 (-2.19) -.036 (-2.02) -.267 (-2.77)
GOV .149 (3.17) .369 (4.00) .349 (4.50) .462 (3.96) .586 (1.19)
FDP .097 (2.77) .203 (2.06) .119 (1.80) .098 (1.48) -.006 (-.02)
LM test 305.49
CREDIT MG RJ SP PR RS
INFL -.321 (-5.02) -.721 (-4.82) -.653 (-6.07) -.287 (-3.02) -.363 (-6.54)
GOV -.243 (-.96) .072 (.10) .448 (.67) .663 (1.62) 1.379 (2.92)
FDP 1.532 (6.78) 3.978 (7.49) 2.326 (5.22) 1.757 (5.23) 1.695 (5.50)
LM test 249.05
PERSONAL
INFL -.058 (-4.55) -.116 (-6.02) -.132 (-4.24) -.023 (-1.14) -.063 (-3.65)
GOV .274 (5.36) .128 (1.60) .535 (2.78) .661 (7.37) .762 (5.42)
FDP .177 (4.52) .276 (4.43) .304 (2.57) .078 (.99) .412 (4.54)
LM test 305.49
T-ratios in parentheses, number of observations: NT = 180. Source: author’s own
calculations.
Given the above evidence, we can comfortably say that the impact of
high and erratic rates of inﬂation on a range of ﬁnancial development mea-
sures is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. Moreover, the pooled evidence,
based on diﬀerent speciﬁcations and panel estimators, clearly points to the
fact that the measures M3 and CREDIT are the ones being aﬀected more
heavily by inﬂation. This is particularly worrying since M3 and CREDIT
include respectively ﬁnancial assets that would not be aﬀected by inﬂation,
for presenting higher rates of nominal and real returns (and hence higher
20levels of indexation), and assets that are important for the formation of
capital (physical and human) in an economy.
Furthermore, the more disaggregated time series evidence based on SUR-
FGLS not only conﬁrms the pooled evidence, but also pinpoints which re-
gions are prone to be more aﬀected by inﬂation. It is the more ﬁnancially de-
veloped regions which are the ones suﬀering most with poor macroeconomic
performance, therefore depriving the country as a whole of an important
engine for enhanced economic growth and development, and for reduced in-
come inequality. On the other hand, it can be said that the poorer regions
of the North and the Northeast are not so aﬀected by inﬂation because they
already have a rather small ﬁnancial sector, i.e. there is a smaller marginal
negative eﬀect of inﬂation on ﬁnance in those regions.
With regards to the other macroeconomic control variables, GOV con-
ﬁrms the fact that more government expenditure at regional level is con-
ducive of ﬁnancial development, and that an increase in FDP leads to more
ﬁnance being made available in the economy.
4 Concluding Remarks
We examined in this paper the statistical and economic relationship be-
tween inﬂation and ﬁnancial development in Brazil from 1985 to 2002. The
results–based on diﬀerent data sets, and on a wide range of estimators,
speciﬁcations and ﬁnancial development measures–suggest that the high
and erratic rates of inﬂation existent at the time clearly reduced ﬁnance in
Brazil.
The economic importance and relevance of understanding the macroeco-
nomic determinants of ﬁnancial development lies in the fact that ﬁnance
is of crucial importance for key economic variables–i.e. economic growth
and development, and income inequality–matters high in the agenda of
any developing country, and in particular Brazil. Moreover, given the sort
of macroeconomic performance displayed at the time in Brazil, and other
developing countries too, inﬂation arises naturally as a proxy for macro-
economic performance and, hence as a factor that is to have an impact on
ﬁnance, and its importance is proved by the results shown in Sections 4.2
and 4.3 above.
The statistical importance of the results presented above is because we
21explore not only the time series variation, but also the panel time series
variation present in the data. We carry out a study based on national and
subnational data, which, ﬁrstly, is believed to more accurately pinpoint the
eﬀects of inﬂation on ﬁnance, and secondly, at least to our knowledge, is
believed to be the ﬁrst time that such a study has been done with Brazilian
data.
Furthermore, we employ a range of estimators that appropriately deal
with the empirical issues present in this sort of T ￿ N data to get better and
more informative estimates. The panel time series analysis also, ﬁrst, avoids
the criticism that the cross-section analysis usually suﬀers, e.g. that peri-
ods of diﬀerent macroeconomic performances end up cancelling each other
out, and second, highlights the advantages of pooling with respect to cross-
sectional analysis when the variables are expected to be I(1). Moreover,
we utilise ﬁnancial development measures that, ﬁrstly take into account the
problem of ﬁnancial repression, and secondly consider the allocation of credit
at a more individual and disaggregated level.
Complementary to the above, the results conﬁrm the theoretical predic-
tion, e.g. Choi, Smith, et al. (1996), and Azariadis and Smith (1996) to
mention a few, that high rates of inﬂation are detrimental to ﬁnancial devel-
opment, and in addition an economy might suﬀer the consequences of a small
and non-inclusive ﬁnancial sector. Therefore, the main policy implication
of the results is that for a developing country to have an eﬃcient ﬁnancial
sector with all its attached beneﬁts, the rates of inﬂation have to be low
and consistently under control. Poor macroeconomic performance can only
bring deleterious eﬀects to a developing economy, i.e. high inequality, er-
ratic growth and low development, and most importantly here, a restrictive
ﬁnancial sector with all its consequences.
A word of caution is necessary though. The data on the monetary ag-
gregates is still only provided at national level by the BACEN. Provision
of these sort of data at regional level would certainly bring more ﬂexibility
in terms of empirical analysis. Having said that, the measures-proxies we
construct capture quite eﬃciently the regional variation of ﬁnancial develop-
ment in Brazil and the absence of regional information cannot be an obstacle
to conduct studies in this area. The panel time series estimates presented in
Section 4.3 mirror the time-series evidence in Section 4.2. Another interest-
ing development in terms of data would be the provision of data on ﬁnancial
22assets at an individual level. These sort of data would not only make it pos-
sible to disaggregate the information we have at the moment even further,
and to check whether the poor are really having access to ﬁnance, but also
to assess how well or badly the debts are being repaid.
A natural extension would be the use of an extended data set covering
only the period from 1994 onwards to investigate how the stable economic
environment aﬀected ﬁnance. Another extension of this work would be an
investigation of how inﬂation and ﬁnance aﬀected economic growth and in-
vestment in Brazil during the troubled 1980s and 1990s. The main question
to be answered would be: did ﬁnance compensate for the detrimental ef-
fects of inﬂation on growth and investment? Finally, as Cooley and Hansen
(1989), and De Gregorio (1993) suggest, an investigation on the eﬀects of
higher inﬂation on labour supply in diﬀerent sectors of the economy (e.g.
underground economy) in Brazil would also be a natural development to be
carried out.
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